PKF AvantEdge

Category: IT Audit (Page 1 of 13)

The Question of QSA Conflict

March 19, 2024 / / 0 Comments

An interesting conversation over coffee with a client today gave me something to mull over a little. The question brought to the table was how some assessors, while engaged in audit, brought up other services they offer like ASV, penetration testing and vulnerability scan and how this may look like a conflict of interest issue.

I will start first by proclaiming that we aren’t QSAs. We do have a myriad of certifications such as ISO and other personal certs in information security, but this article isn’t about our resume. It’s the ever important question of the role of the QSA and whether they should be providing advisory services.

Why we choose not to go the route of QSAs is for another article, but suffice to say, in the same regard we work with CBs for ISO projects, we employ the same business model for PCI or any other certification projects. We rabidly believe in the clear demarcation of those doing the audit and those doing the implementation and advisory. After all, we are in the DNAs of statutory auditors and every single customers or potential customers we have require a specific conflict check, in order to ensure independence and not provide consulting work that may jeopardize our opinions when it comes to audit. Does anyone recall Enron? Worldcom? Waste Management? Goodbye, 90 year old accounting firm.

We have worked with many QSAs in almost 14 years of doing PCI-DSS – and here, QSAs I mean by individuals as well as QSA-Cs (QSA Companies). Our group here is collectively made up of senior practitioners in information security and compliance, so we don’t have fresh graduates or juniors going about advising 20 years plus C level veterans on how to run their networks or business.

A QSA (Qualified Security Assessor) company in a nutshell is a company that is qualified by the PCI Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) to perform assessments of organization against the PCI standards. Take note of the word: QUALIFIED. This becomes important because there is a very strict re-qualification program from the PCI-SSC to ensure that the quality of QSAs are maintained. Essentially, QSAs are vouched by the PCI SSC to carry out assessment tasks. Are all QSAs created equal? Probaby not as based on our experience some are probably better than others in specific aspects of PCI-DSS. Even the PCI SSC has a special group of QSAs under their Global Executive Assessor Roundtable (GEAR), which we will touch on later.

The primary function of a QSA company is to evaluate and verify an organisation’s adherence to the PCI DSS requirements. This involves a thorough examination of the organisation’s cardholder data environment (CDE) — including its security systems, network architecture, access controls, and policies — to ensure that they meet the PCI requirements.

Following the assessment, the QSA company will then prepare a Report on Compliance (RoC) and an Attestation of Compliance (AoC), which are formal documents that certify the organization’s compliance status. Please don’t get me started on the dang certificate because I will lose another year of my life with high blood pressure. These OFFICIAL documents are critical for the organization to demonstrate the company’s commitment to security to partners, customers, and regulatory bodies. The certificate, however, can be framed to be hanged on the wall of your toilet, where it rightfully belongs. Right next to the toilet paper, which has probably a slightly higher value.

Anyway, QSAs have very specific roles defined by the SSC:

– Validating and confirming Cardholder Data Environment (CDE) scope as defined by the assessed entity.
– Selecting employees, facilities, systems, and system components accurately representing the assessed environment if sampling is employed.
– Being present onsite at the assessed entity for the duration of each PCI DSS Assessment or perform remote assessment activities in accordance with applicable PCI SSC assessment guidance.
– Evaluating compensating controls, as applicable.
– Identifying and documenting items noted for improvement, as applicable.
– Evaluating customized controls and deriving testing procedures to test those controls, as applicable.
– Providing an opinion about whether the assessed entity meets PCI DSS Requirements.
– Effectively using the PCI DSS ROC Template to produce Reports on Compliance.
– Validating and attesting as to an entity’s PCI DSS compliance status.
– Maintaining documents, workpapers, and interview notes that were collected during the PCI DSS Assessment and used to validate the findings.
– Applying and maintaining independent judgement in all PCI DSS Assessment decisions.
– Conducting follow-up assessments, as needed

QSA PROGRAM GUIDE 2023

You can see above, there is no advisory, recommendation, consultation, implementation work listed. It’s purely assessment and audit. What we do see are more often than not, QSAs do offer other services under separate entities. This isn’t disallowed specifically, but the SSC does recommend a healthy dose of independence:

The QSA Company must have separation of duties controls in place to ensure Assessor Employees conducting or assisting with PCI SSC Assessments are independent and not subject to any conflict of interest.

QSA Qualification requirements 2023

Its hard to adjudge this point, but the one providing the audit shouldn’t be the one providing the consultation and advisory services. Some companies get around this by having a separate arm providing special consultation. Which is where we step in, as without doing any gymnastics in organizational reference, we make a clear demarcation of who does the audit and who does the consultation and advisory role.

The next time you receive any proposal, be sure to ask the pertinent question: are they also providing support and advisory? Because a good part of the project is in that, not so much of the audit. We have actually seen cases where the engaged assessor flat out refused to provide any consultative or advisory or templates or anything to assist the customer due to conflict of interest, leaving the client hanging high and dry unless they engage another consultative project with them separately. Is that the assessor’s fault? In theory, the assessor is simply abiding with the requirements for independence. On the other hand, these things should have been mentioned before the engagement, that a bulk of the PCI project would be in the remediation part and definitely guidance and consultation would be needed! It might reek of being a little disingenuous. It’s frustrating for us when we get pulled in halfway through a project and we ask, well why haven’t you query your engaged QSA on this question? Well, because they want another sum of money for their consultative works, or they keep upselling us services that we are not sure we need unless we get their advisory in. What do you think their advisory is going to say? You can see whereas on paper, it might be easy to state that independence has been established, in reality, it’s often difficult to distinguish where the audit, recommendations, advisory and services all start or end as sometimes it’s all mashed. Like potatoes.

Here’s the another official reference to this issue in FAQ #1562 (shortened)

If a QSA Employee(s) recommends, designs, develops, provides, or implements controls for an entity, it is a conflict of interest for the same QSA Employee(s) to assess that control(s) or the requirement(s) impacted by the control(s).

Another QSA Employee of the same QSA Company (or subcontracted QSA) – not involved in designing, developing, or implementing the controls – may assess the effectiveness of the control(s) and/or the requirement(s) impacted by the control(s). The QSA Company must ensure adequate, documented, and defendable separation of duties is in place within its organization to prevent independence conflicts.

FAQ #1562

Again, this is fairly clear that QSAs providing both assessment and advisory/implementation services are not incorrect in doing so, but need to ensure that proper safeguards are in place, presumably to be checked thoroughly by their requalification requirements, under section 2.2 “Independence” of the QSA requalification document. To save you time on reading, there isn’t much prescriptive way to ensure this independence, so we’re left to how the company decides on their conflict of interest policies. Our service is to ensure with confidence that the advice you receive is indeed independent and as much as we know, to benefit the customer, not the assessor. We don’t have skin in their services.

In summary, QSAs can theoretically provide services but it should come separately from the audit, so ensure you get the right understanding before starting off your PCI journey. Furthermore and more concerningly, we’ve seen QSAs refused to validate the scope provided to them, citing that this constitute ‘consulting and advisory’ and needs additional payment. This is literally the first task a QSA does in their list of responsibility, so call them out on it or call us in and let us deal with them. These charlatans shouldn’t even be QSAs in the first place if this is what they are saying.

And finally, speaking on QSAs that are worth their salt – the primary one we often work with Controlcase has been included in the PCI SSC Global Executive Assessor Roundtable 2024 (GEAR 2024).

https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/about_us/global_executive_assessor_roundtable/

These are nominated as an Executive Committee level advisory board comprising senior executives from PCI SSC assessor companies, that serves as a direct channel for communication between the senior leadership of payment security assessors and PCI SSC senior leadership.

In other words, if you want to know who the SSC looks to for PCI input, these are the guys. Personally, especially for complex level 1 certification, this would be the first group of QSAs I would start considering before approaching others, as these are nominated based on reputation, endeavor and commitment to the security standards — not companies that cough out money to sponsor events or conferences, or look prominent in their dazzling booths, give free gifts but is ultimately unable to deliver their projects properly to their clients.

Let us know via email to pcidss@pkfmalaysia.com if you have any queries on PCI-DSS, especially the new version 4.0 or any other compliances such as ISO27001, NIST, RMIT etc!

Zero Trust for 2024

January 3, 2024 / / 0 Comments

As we enter into the new year, lets start off with a topic that most cybersecurity denizens would have heard of and let’s clarify it a little.

Zero Trust.

It seems a good place as any, to start 2024 off with the pessimism that accompanied the end of last year – the spate of cybersecurity attacks in 2023 had given us a taste of what is to come – insurance company – check, social security – check, the app with our vaccination information – check. While breaking down the attacks is meant for another article, what we are approaching now for the coming year is not just more of the same, but much more and more advanced attacks are bound to happen.

While Zero Trust is simply a concept – one of many – to increase resistance to attacks or breach, it’s by no means a silver bullet. There is NO silver bullet to this. We are in a constant siege of information warfare and the constant need to balance the need for sharing and the need for protection. It is as they say; the safest place would be in a cave. But that’s now living, that’s surviving. If you need to go somewhere, you need to fly, you have information with the airlines. If you need to do banking, you have information with the banks. If you need to conduct your daily shopping online, you are entrusting these guys like Lazada et al the information that otherwise you may not likely provide.

So Zero Trust isn’t the fact that you conduct zero transaction, its basically a simple principle: Trust no one, Verify everything. Compare it to the more traditional “trust but verify” approach, which assumed that everything inside an organisation’s network should be trusted, even if we do have verifications of it. Here’s a breakdown of the concept, in hopefully simpler terms.

The Basic Premise: Imagine a company as a fortified castle. In the old days, once you were inside the castle walls, it was assumed you belonged there and could roam freely. At least this is based on the limited studies we have done by binge watching Game of Thrones. All historical facts of the middle ages can be verified through Game of Thrones, including the correct anatomy of a dragon.

Back to the analogy, what if an enemy disguised as a friend managed to get inside? They would potentially have access to everything. Zero Trust Architecture operates on the assumption that threats can exist both outside and inside the walls. Therefore, it verifies everyone’s identity and privileges, no matter where they are, before granting access to the castle’s resources. The 3 keys you can remember can be:

  1. Never Trust, Always Verify: Zero Trust means no implicit trust is granted to assets or user accounts based solely on their physical or network location (i.e., local area networks versus the internet) or based on asset ownership (enterprise or personally owned). Basically, we are saying, I don’t care where you are or who you are, you are not having access to this system until I can verify who you are.
  2. Least Privilege Access: Individuals or systems are given the minimum levels of access — or permissions — needed to perform their tasks. This limits the potential damage from incidents such as breaches or employee mistakes. We see this issue a lot, whereby a C level person insist on having access to everything even if he doesn’t necessarily know how to navigate a system without a mouse. When asked why, they say, well, because I am the boss. No. In Zero Trust, in fact, because you are the boss, you shouldn’t have access into a system that does not require your meddling. Get more sales and let the tech guys do their job!
  3. Micro-Segmentation: The network is broken into smaller zones to maintain separate access for separate parts of the network. If a hacker breaches one segment, they won’t have access to the entire network.

The steps you can follow to implement the concept of Zero Trust:

Identify Sensitive Data: Know where your critical data is stored and who has access to it. You can’t protect everything. Or at least not with the budget you are given, which for most IT groups, usually is slightly more than they allocate to upkeep the company’s cat. So data identification is a must-have. Find out what is the data that you most want to protect and spend your shoe-string budget to protect it!

Verify Identity Rigorously: Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) and identity verification for anyone trying to access resources, especially important resources like logging systems, firewalls, external webservers etc. This could mean something you know (password), something you have (a smartphone or token), or something you are (biometrics). It used to cost a mortgage to implement things like this but over the years, cheaper solutions which are just as good are now available.

Contextual Access: Access decisions should consider the context. For example, accessing sensitive data from a company laptop in the office might be okay, but trying to access the same data from a personal device in a coffee shop might not be. This may not be easy, because now with mobile devices, you are basically accessing top secret information via the same device that you watch the cat playing the piano. Its a nightmare for IT security – but again, this has to have discipline. If you honestly need to access the server from Starbucks , then implement key controls like MFA, VPN, layered security and from a locked-down system.

Inspect and Log Traffic: Continuously monitor and log traffic for suspicious activity. If something unusual is detected, access can be automatically restricted. SOAR and SIEM products have advanced considerably over the years and today we have many solutions that do not require you to sell a kidney to use. This is beneficial as small companies are usually targeted for attacks, especially if these smaller companies services larger companies.

At the end, it all comes down to what are the benefits to adopt this approach.

Enhanced Security: By verifying everything, Zero Trust minimizes the chances of unauthorised access, thereby enhancing overall security. Hopefully. Of course, we may still have those authorised but have malicious intent, which would be much harder to protect from.

Data Protection: Sensitive data is better protected when access is tightly controlled and monitored. This equates to less quarter given to threat players out there.

Adaptability: Zero Trust is not tied to any one technology or platform and can adapt to the changing IT environment and emerging threats.

On the downside, there are still some challenges we need to surmount:

Complexity: Implementing Zero Trust can be complex, requiring changes in technology and culture. It’s not a single product but a security strategy that might involve various tools and technologies. This is not just a technical challenge as well, but a process and cultural change that may take time to adapt to.

User Experience: If not implemented thoughtfully, Zero Trust can lead to a cumbersome user experience with repeated authentication requests and restricted access. This is a problem we see a lot, especially in finance and insurance – user experience is key – but efficiency and security are like oil and water. Eternal enemies. Vader and Skywalker. Lex and Supes. United and Liverpool. Pineapple and Pizza.

Continuous Monitoring: Zero Trust requires continuous monitoring and adjustment of security policies and systems, which can be resource-intensive. We’ve seen implementation of SIEM and SOAR products which are basically producing so many alerts and alarms that it makes no sense anymore. These all become noise and the effects of monitoring is diluted.

In summary, an era where cyber threats are increasingly sophisticated and insiders can pose as much of a threat as external attackers, Zero Trust Architecture offers a robust framework for protecting an organisation’s critical assets. It’s about making our security proactive rather than reactive and ensuring that the right people have the right access at the right times, and under the right conditions. It’s culturally difficult, especially in Malaysia, where I will have to admit, our innate trust of people and our sense of bringing up means we always almost would open the door for the guy behind us to walk in, especially if he is dressed like the boss. We hardly would turn around and ask, “Who are you?” because we are such nice people in this country.

But, adopt we must. For any organisation looking to bolster its cybersecurity posture, Zero Trust isn’t just an option; it’s becoming a necessity. In PKF we have several services and products promoting Zero Trust – contact us at avantedge@pkfmalaysia.com and find out more. Happy New Year!

Gearing Up: How New Cybersecurity Guidelines Accelerate the Automotive Industry Security

December 7, 2023 / / 0 Comments

So here you are, with your new spanking SUV that is fully EV and fully automated, with the most state of the art systems inbuilt. You get into the car, switch everything on, put in your favourite tune and head off to work. Suddenly, out of nowhere, your speakers go bonkers and suddenly says in an ominous voice, “Now I got you…” and your steering decides to turn despite your best effort to right it and the accelerator depresses despite you removing your feet off the pedal and your brakes don’t work anymore. You watch helplessly as your car flies over the embankment 120 km an hour.

Homicide by the car. Open your pod bay doors, Hal.

This seems far removed from current reality, but it might not be as far as we think.

Cyberattacks are on the rise in the traditional automotive industry in recent years, as cars become more dependent on circuits and electronics as opposed to mechanics and gaskets.

Connectivity defines the modern vehicle. With some cars containing over 100 million lines of code and processing nearly 25GB of data per hour, computerization radically reimagines mobility – enabling telematics, infotainment and autonomous drive capabilities that were unthinkable barely a decade ago. This software-ized transformation, securing IT components against cyber risks grows ever-more vital. As showcased by researchers commandeering functions like braking and steering via consumer Wi-Fi or compromised infotainment apps, hackers now have pathways into safety-critical vehicle controls. Highly automated models promise even larger attack surfaces.

In the future, mechanics will be phased out by electronic engineers to fix cars. You would go to an electronic shop instead of a mechanic shop. Say goodbye to the toothy uncle with the towel around his shoulder shaking his leg in his greasy shirt.

Bearing this in mind, the Japanese automotive industry is making serious efforts to improve cybersecurity. The Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) and the Japan Auto Parts Industries Association (JAPIA) both formed cybersecurity working groups. These two collaborated in 2019 to develop the JAMA/JAPIA Cybersecurity Guidelines, and on March 31, 2022, a second version was released to help steer the industry toward a more cyber-resilient course. Spanning 156 requirements aligned to internationally recognized standards, the guidelines furnish a sector-specific blueprint for fortifying defenses.

Who Do the Guidelines Target?

Given deepening connectivity between various players, the guidelines take broad aim across the mobility ecosystem:

  • Automobile manufacturers
  • Major Tier 1 parts suppliers
  • Software and semiconductor vendors tightly integrated into products
  • Telecommunications carriers facilitating connectivity
  • Fleet operations centers managing vehicle data
  • Components manufacturers farther down supply tiers
  • Aftermarket service providers accessing internal buses
  • Dealership networks bridging manufacturers and consumers
  • Academic partners feeding talent pipelines

Essentially, any entity handling sensitive intellectual property or providing critical products/services supporting vehicle R&D, manufacturing, sales, maintenance or communications should adhere to the prescribed cyber controls. This is fairly normal, like other standards out there, sub-contractors usually take the hit, as these standards are pushed down from the top.

While the guidelines focus on securing corporate IT environments, they spotlight risks from increasing convergence of enterprise and industrial assets. As connected platforms, analytics and cloud infrastructures provide gateway for adversaries into production systems, shoring up corporate IT protection grows imperative.

Three-Year Roadmap for Enhancing Cybersecurity Posture

Given the significant dedication for properly implementing comprehensive cybersecurity management programs, requirements are divided into three priority tiers reflecting basic, intermediate and advanced measures. The purpose of this is to demonstrate the minimum necessary countermeasures that must be used regardless of company size. This division allows organizations to methodically elevate security stature over a three-year adoption roadmap:

Level 1 – Basic Security Hygiene (Mandatory):

The 35+ non-negotiable Level 1 controls target universals like access management, malware defenses, monitoring fundamentals, compliance auditing, encryption, and security training. These form basic cyber hygiene mandatory across all auto sector entities. These requirements are intended to build a chain of security and trust between companies and their business partners and are also applicable to small and medium-sized enterprises. Non automative industry might do well to also use some of these as baseline cybersecurity practices. It’s basically cybersecurity hygiene. And we all know Japan has the best hygiene in the world, right?

Level 2 – Best Practices (2 Years):

An additional 60+ intermediate requirements call out data protection expansions, enhanced monitoring/logging, vulnerability management, security testing and supply chain risk management practices. Deeper employee training and executive awareness campaigns also feature.

Firms handling sensitive IP or high transaction volumes are expected to adopt Level 1 and 2 guidelines covering both foundational and sector-specific heightened risk areas within two years.

Companies should implement these controls, especially if they meet one of the following conditions:

1. Companies handling external confidential information (technical, customer information, etc.) within the supply chain.

2. Companies with significant internal technology/information relevant to the automotive industry.

3. Companies with a reasonable size/share that could have a significant impact on the industry supply chain due to unexpected disruptions.

Level 3 – Advanced Protections (3 Years):

Finally, over 50 sophisticated measures comprise the advanced tier targeting state-of-the-art safeguards. Encryption ubiquity, advanced behavioral monitoring, automated validation testing, penetration assessments and further elevation of risk management programs defined here help drive the industry’s cybermaturity.

These practices showcase leadership, with Level 3 representing an ultimate target for manufacturers expected to benchmark sector-wide security.

Built-in Flexibility Accounts for Organization Size

The tiered model acknowledges the varying cybersecurity investment capabilities across the industry landscape. This allows smaller players an achievable Level 1 entry point before working toward the expanded Layer 2 and 3 guidelines on a timeline proportional to organizational size and risk.

Again, in comparison to standards like PCI-DSS that also adopts similar tiered approach for compliance, this makes sense, given the number of different entities affected by this standard.

Checklist Format Provides Clear Milestones for Growth

To ease adoption, requirements trace to numbered checkpoints within a detailed appendix. This enumerated format lets companies definitively benchmark postures against guidelines and methodically strengthen defenses while tracking progress.

Shared criteria similarly help suppliers demonstrate security improvements to automaker customers through consistent maturity evaluations, facilitating trust in the supply chain.

Guidance Tuned to Automotive Sector Risk Landscape

Along with staging requirements by attainability, guidelines tailor controls and concepts to risks distinct from other industries. While mapping extensively to internationally recognized standards like NIST and ISO27K, authors customized content to the sector’s specialized threats and priorities.

For example, Level 1 mandates continuous monitoring for unauthorized access or malware activity. This acknowledges the havoc potential of a breach within an interconnected web of automakers, parts suppliers and assembly lines. Different secure zones and security focuses blur the lines on whether if (or when) a breach occurs, whose problem is that, how do we track it?

The repeated emphasis on supply chain oversight, information exchange standards and third-party security likewise reflects the complex hand-offs and trust relationships fundamental to mobility ecosystem operations.

Build Cyber Resilience Across Fragmented Environments

As vehicles evolve into software-defined platforms, cyber principles growing from these Japanese guidelines can shape sector-wide baseline resilience. Automotive IT interconnectivity will only intensify, making comprehensive, unified cybersecurity strategy essential. The scenario of the killer SUV may still be well into the future, but everything starts somewhere and as the world move more into the electronic and artificial, so too our dependence on everyday technology that we take for granted.

Whether global manufacturer or tiny niche parts maker, each player shares responsibility for hardening the greater environment. Just as drivetrains integrate thousands of precision components into harmonized mechanical systems, robust digital defenses emerge from many entities working in synch.

Implementing defined building blocks now allows the industry to preemptively navigate obstacles that could imperil revolutionary mobility pursuits ahead. For those seeking secure footing in the auto sector’s cyber journey, this three-year roadmap paves a straight path forward. This isn’t just for Japanese companies, but for any company whether in Malaysia or other regions that does business with Japanese automakers. This is a clarion call to the industry that cybersecurity should be foremost in the board’s agenda. Contact us at avantedge@pkfmalaysia.com and we will immediately get back to you. With our Japanese auditor and implementation partners, we can assist you in any way you want in navigating this standard.

Unless of course, you are in your Killer Suv. In that case, we can’t navigate that. Good luck!

Introduction to ISO27001 (Information Security Management System)

January 16, 2023 / / 2 Comments

One of our goal for 2023 is to provide more content in our technical articles, not just on PCI-DSS (which we have been primarily writing on), but on other areas where we are focused on. In fact, customers often express a little surprise when we tell them that we also do a lot of consulting on ISO27001, SOC1, SOC2, CSA, ISO2000 and pretty much the main technology compliances, even extending to NIST 800-171 and lesser known standards out there. They primarily associate us with PCI-DSS, which, while it is true it still is our main business, serves as a reminder to them and to us that we often end up forgetting to market our other services.

The other branch where we are very active in is in ISO27001. Like PCI-DSS, we do not do the certification (we leave that to the certifying body), because we often find ourselves helping our customers implement the system itself, and are generally very much involved in building policies, framework and guiding them through the standard.

Before we jump too deep in, let’s wade a bit into the standard for this article.

ISO 27001 is an international standard that outlines the requirements for an information security management system (ISMS). A company can certify to ISO 27001 by implementing the standard and undergoing an audit by a third-party certifying body.

Here are the steps a company can take to certify to ISO 27001:

  1. Understand the standard: Familiarise yourself with the requirements of ISO 27001, including the management system and control objectives.
  2. Perform a gap analysis: Compare your current information security practices to the requirements of the standard to identify any gaps that need to be addressed.
  3. Develop an ISMS: Implement an ISMS that meets the requirements of the standard. This should include policies, procedures, and controls that cover all aspects of information security, including risk management, incident management, and compliance.
  4. Implement the ISMS: Put the ISMS into practice by training employees, updating procedures, and monitoring compliance.
  5. Conduct internal audits: Regularly conduct internal audits to ensure that the ISMS is being effectively implemented and to identify any areas for improvement.
  6. Seek certification: Once the ISMS is fully implemented and operational, seek certification from a third-party certifying body. The certifying body will conduct an audit to ensure that the ISMS meets the requirements of the standard.
  7. Maintain certification: Once certified, it is important to maintain compliance with the standard by regularly reviewing and updating the ISMS, and undergoing periodic surveillance audits.

Certifying to ISO 27001 demonstrates to customers, partners, and regulators that a company is committed to managing and protecting sensitive information, and that it has implemented best practices for information security.

Like all standards, you should go in with your eyes open, as there are several major challenges that companies may face when attempting to certify to ISO 27001, if we were to address it step-by-step in the process described above:

  1. Understanding the standard: The standard is quite comprehensive, and it can be difficult for companies to fully understand all of the requirements and how they apply to their specific organization. The standard doesn’t apply the same for all companies, so beware. It’s not a checklist, either or a cookie cutter standard where you just take lock, stock and two smoking barrels all the requirements and force it down your own throat. There is the risk assessment process, the selection of controls, the statement of applicability – all of which, you can do it on your own or we can help you navigate through the forest of information.
  2. Conducting a gap analysis: Identifying gaps in an organization’s current information security practices can be a challenging task, especially for larger companies with complex systems and processes. Additionally, multiple departments make it more formidable to define scope. Unlike PCI-DSS (which is very definite in terms of scope), the expansion and boundaries of the ISMS can be much less clear.
  3. Implementing an ISMS: Developing and implementing an ISMS that meets the requirements of the standard can be a significant undertaking. It may require significant changes to existing policies and procedures, as well as the implementation of new controls. Expectations, time-resources are often overlooked as well and we have experience where companies go half in and then decide the water is too cold and they back off. It’s always important to set the tone early, set it from the top, which brings us to the next point.
  4. Employee buy-in: Getting employees to understand and buy-in to the importance of information security and to follow the new policies and procedures can be a significant challenge. By far, like any other standard, it’s not really a technical hurdle that often foil a company seeking certification, but human hurdle. People are too busy, or too focused on other areas; they simply do not have time. Without a top-down push, you will find a significant impediment convincing people that this is important. It’s a cliché but it’s true: the project is not an IT project, but a business project.
  5. Cost: Implementing an ISMS and seeking certification can be costly, especially for small and medium-sized businesses. Many a times, potential customers go in with the idea that a budget of RM10k would be enough to go end to end. Now, I am not saying it’s impossible; but it would be very difficult to properly implement an ISMS without a proper budget. The range may vary, true, depending on how much work you can do on your own, but in general, like PCI-DSS, you probably would have to look at a fairly generous budget if this is your first time undertaking ISMS and you do not have an internal team to handle the compliance.
  6. Maintaining compliance: Once certified, it is important to maintain compliance with the standard by regularly reviewing and updating the ISMS, and undergoing periodic surveillance audits. This can be a significant ongoing effort, and it requires dedicated resources to ensure ongoing compliance. The cycle goes through surveillance audit 2 years after the initial certification and re-certification on the third cycle. Survelliance audit is still a fair bit of work as you need to demonstrate compliance to the ISMS standard over the period of the cycle (12 months).
  7. Finding qualified and experienced team: Identifying a qualified and experienced consultants who understand the process and how auditors work can be a big help. Understanding how the auditor conducts a thorough audit and provide valuable feedback on the ISMS can be a challenge, especially for companies that fairly unique in their process or have specific industry requirements.

By understanding these challenges and developing a plan to address them, companies can increase their chances of successfully certifying to ISO 27001. Contact us at avantedge@pkfmalaysia.com for more information on how we can help you begin your ISO27001 journey.

Recap on PCI v4.0: Changes in The 12 Requirements

January 12, 2023 / / 0 Comments

So here we are in 2023 and PCIv4.0 is on everyone’s thoughts. Most of our customers have finished their 2022 cycle; and some are going through their 2023 cycle. Anyone certifying this year in general, means that for the next cycle on 2024, they will be certified against v4.0. V3.2.1 will be sunset in March 2024, so as a general rule of thumb, anyone going for certification/recertification in 2024 – hop onto v4.0.

Take also special note of the requirements where statements are “Best practices until 31 March 2025, after which these requirements will be required and must be fully considered during a PCI DSS assessment “.

It doesn’t mean that you can actively ignore these requirements until 2025; rather, to use this period of around 2 years as a transition period for your business to move into these newer requirements. So, to put it short: start even now. One of the requirements that gets a lot of flak is 3.5.1.2 which is the disk level encryption; in other words, technology like TDE being used to address encryption requirements. This is no longer a get out of jail free card because after March 2025, you will need to implement (on top of TDE, if you still insist on using it), if you are not using it on removable media – the 4 horsemen of the apocalypse – Truncation, Tokenization, Encryption or Hashing. And before you get too smart and say yes, you are using Encryption already, i.e transparent or disk-level encryption; PCI is one step ahead of you, you Maestro of Maleficant Excuses, as they spell out “through truncation or a data-level encryption mechanism“.

So, for v4.0 it’s probably easier to just break it up into

a) SAQs v4.0 – Self assessment

This is straight forward – a lot of changes have occurred to some of the venerable SAQs out there, such as SAQ A. I’ll cover that in another article.

b) ROC v4.0 – from QSA/ISA

Most QSAs should be able to certify against v4.0. You can check on the PCI-DSS QSA lists, they have ” ** PCI DSS v4 Assessors  ” under their names. There also may be some shakeout that some underqualified QSAs may not go through the training to upgrade to v4 assessors. On another note, ISAs don’t generally have these requirements to upgrade to v4.0; although it’s recommended.

Now, perhaps is a good time to just go through a very big overview of V4.0 and explain why some of these changes had been effected.

Changes to Requirements

For this overview, we will first look at the 12 requirements statements and see where the changes are. In a big move, the council has updated the main requirements (not so subtly), getting rid of many of the tropes of previous incarnation of the standard. Let’s start here.

Requirement 1 is now changed to “Install and Maintain Network Security Controls” as opposed to “Install and maintain firewall configuration to protect CHD.”

This is a good change; even if the wordings are still a little clumsy. After all Network Security Controls are defined so broadly and may not just be a service or product like a firewall or a NAC or TACACs. It could be access controls, AAA policies, IAM practices, password policies, remote access controls etc. So how do you ‘install’ such policies or practices? A better word would be to “Implement” but I think that’s nitpicking. Install is an OK word here, but everytime I hear that, I think of someone installing a subwoofer in my car or installing an air-cond in my rental unit. But overall, it’s a lot better than just relying on the firewall word – since in today’s environment, a firewall may no longer just function as a firewall anymore; and integrated security systems are fairly common where multiple security functions are rolled into one.

Requirement 2 now reads as “Apply Secure Configurations to All System Components.” Which is a heck better than “Do not use vendor supplied defaults for system passwords and other security parameter.” The latter always sounded so off, as if it’s like a foster child that never belonged to the family. Because it reads more like a control objective or part of a smaller subset of control area as opposed to an overarching requirement. It just made PCI sounds juvenile compared to much better written standards like the ISO, or NIST or CIS.

Requirement 3 changes are subtle from “Protect stored cardholder data” to “Protect stored account data” – they removed cardholder data and replace it with “account” data. It generally means the same thing; but with account data, they possibly want to broaden the applicability of the standard. Afterall, it may be soon that cards may be obsolete; and it might be all information will be contained in the mobile device, or authenticated through virtual cloud services. Hence a traditional person ‘holding a card’ may no longer be a concept anymore.

Requirement 4 reverts back to cardholder data, with the new 4.0 stating “Protect Cardholder Data with Strong Cryptography During Transmission Over Open, Public Networks”. Which is sometimes frustrating. If you have decided to call account data moving forward, just call it account data and not revert back to cardholder data. Also this requirement changed from the older “Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks”. It may sound the same, but it’s different. It removes the age old confusion on, what if I encrypt my data first and then only transmit it? In the previous definition, it doesn’t matter. The transmission still needs to be encrypted by the way it is written. However, with the new definition, you are now able to encrypt the data and send it across an unencrypted channel (though not recommended) and still be in compliance. Ah, English.

“Requirement 5: Protect All Systems and Networks from Malicious Software” is a definite upgrade from the old “Requirement 5: Protect all systems against malware and regularly update anti-virus software or programs”. This gives a better context from the anti-virus trope – where QSAs insist on every system having an antivirus even if its running on VAX or even if it brings down the database with its constant updates. Now, with a broader understanding that anti-virus is NOT the solution to malicious software threats; we are able to move to a myriad of end point security that serves a better purpose to the requirement. So long, CLAMAV for Linux and Unix!

Requirement 6 reads about the same except they changed the word ‘applications’ to software i.e “Develop and maintain secure systems and applications” to “Develop and Maintain Secure Systems and Software”. I am not sure why; but I suppose that many software that may serve as a vector of attack may not be classified as an application. It could be a middle ware, or an API etc.

By the way, just to meander away here. I noted that in V4.0 requirements, every word’s first letter is Capitalised, except for minor words like conjuctions, prepositions, articles. This seems to be in line with some of the published standards such as CIS (but not NIST), and its basically just an interesting way to write it. This style is called “Title Case”, and It Can Be Overused and Abused Quite a Lot if We Are Not Careful.

Requirement 7: Restrict Access to System Components and Cardholder Data by Business Need to Know vs previous version Requirement 7: Restrict access to cardholder data by business need to know. Again, this is more expansionary; as system components (we assume those in scope) may not just be containing cardholder data; but have influence over the security posture of the environment overall. Where previously you may say, well, it’s only access to the account data that requires ‘business need to know’ or least privvy; now, access to authentication devices; or SIEM, or any security based service that influences the security posture of the environment – all these accesses must be restricted to business need to know. Again – this is a good thing.

Requirement 8: Identify Users and Authenticate Access to System Components vs previous version “Identify and authenticate access to system components”. This seems like just an aesthetic fix. Since, yes, you probably want to identify USERS as opposed to identify ACCESS. It could mean the same thing, or it may not. A smart alec somewhere probably told the QSA, hey, we identified the access properly. It came from login 24601 from the bakery department at 6 am yesterday. Do we know the user? No, but PCI just needs us to identify the ‘access’ and not the user, right? OK, smart alec.

Requirement 9: Restrict Physical Access to Cardholder Data is the only one that does not have any changes, except for the aforementioned Title Case changes.

Requirement 10: Log and Monitor All Access to System Components and Cardholder Data vs Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data. So two things changed here. “Log” vs “Track” and System Components vs Network Resources. I personally find the first change a bit limiting when you are saying to just log instead of ‘track’. But I know why they did it. Because Tracking is redundant, if you are already Monitoring it. So in another dimension somewhere, the same smart alec may state, no where did it tell us to ‘log’ or keep logs in this statement – they just want us to Track/Monitor users. So its just for clarity that from here on, you log and monitor, not just track/monitor. The second change is very good, because now, there is no ambiguity for non-network resources. It’s true when one day, we actually came across a client stating this does not apply to them because they do not put their critical systems on the network and they only use terminal access to it, therefore there’s no need to log or monitor. The creativity of these geniuses know no bounds when it comes to avoiding requirements.

Requirement 11: Test Security of Systems and Networks Regularly vs Regularly test security systems and processes. Switching the word regularly is done just for aesthetic reading, but the newer word strings better and again, removes ambiguity. I mean first thing, the older requirement tells us to test ‘security systems’. Now most of the workstations et al may not be defined as ‘security systems’. I would define security systems as a system that contributes to the security posture of a company – an authentication system, a logging system, the NAC, the firewall etc. Of course, this isn’t what PCI meant and they realised, snap, English is really a cruel language. “Security systems” does not equal to “Security of Systems”. That two letters there changed everything. Now, systems are defined as any system in scope – not just one that influences security. We need to test security of all systems in scope. The second change to remove processes and insert in Networks is better, I agree. I did have a client asking me, how do we ‘test processes’ for PCI. Do we need to audit and check the human process of doing something? While that is true in an audit, that’s not the spirit of this requirement. This is for technical testing, i.e scans, penetration testing etc. So rightly, they removed ‘processes’ and inserted Networks; which also clears the ambiguity of performance of a network penetration testing, as well as application penetration testing.

Again, I just want to add, all these are actually clarified in the sub controls in the both v3.2.1 and v4.0 but if someone were just to skate through PCI reading the main requirements titles – I can see where the misunderstanding may occur with the old titles.

Finally, Requirement 12 Support Information Security with Organizational Policies and Programs is an upgrade from the previous Maintain a policy that addresses information security for all personnel. The previous title was just clumsy. Many clients understood it to be a single policy, or information security policy that needs to be drawn up, because it states Maintain A Policy. One Policy to rule them all. And this policy governs information security for all humans. Which doesn’t make sense. Unless the ‘for’ here was to mean that this policy needs to be adhered by all personnel; not that the personnel were the subjects of the information security. Yikes. The newer route makes more sense. Have your policies and programs support information security overall. Not information security of your people; but information security, period.

So just by reading the titles (and not going deep dive yet), we can see the improvement in clarifying certain things. There is more function in the sentence; there is more of an overarching purpose to it and most of all, it looks and reads more professionally that puts PCI more into the stately tomes of ISO, CIS or NIST.

While waiting for the next deep dive article, drop us a note at pcidss@pkfmalaysia.com if you have any queries at all about PCI, ISO27001, NIST, SOC or any standard at all. Happy New Year, all!

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