Tag: PCI-DSS (Page 1 of 9)

PCI-DSS: Estimating the Cost

Ah money.

This is how most conversations start when we receive calls from PCI. How much will it cost?

I think this is one of the toughest subject for PCI, because it really depends on what is being done by the service provider/consultant for you, and how much you can actually do the implementation of PCI-DSS on your own. And obviously it also depends on your scope, and on top of that, depends on compensating controls if any, or any current controls you have in place. And then it also depends on the validation type – SAQ vs RoC and so on.

So, in the classic riposte to this classic question, it would be “It depends”.

Where we really need to clear the air though is the myth that once you have done PCI-DSS the first time, everything gets easier on the renewals and everything gets cheaper year on year going forward. That is for another article. There is a lot of things going on in PCI-DSS, and if you approach it from a product perspective (like most procurement do), you end up either sabotaging your entire compliance, or getting an auditor willing to sign off on God knows what, and later on realise that you’ve been out of compliance scope all the while.

To start with the pricing, you should understand a bit on the cost of PCI-DSS. And we should start with the QSA, because after all they are the focal point of the PCI program. They are the Qualified Security Assessor. Of course, you can opt to do your PCI (if allowed) without a QSA involvement (Merchant level 3 or 4) and just fill up an SAQ with or without assistance from consultants; but for the most part, a QSA would be involved in the signoff for larger projects, and this is where the cost questions take life.

Lets look firstly at the base cost of becoming a QSA. It’s very helpfully listed for us here: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/program_training_and_qualification/fees

So here are the maths. Imagine you are a QSA with projects in Malaysia: to start off, you will need to set aside over RM100K just to get you qualified to to audits in the Asian Region. We’re not talking about Europe or Latin America or USA here. Just APAC. That’s qualifying the company. A company, to service any region properly will probably need a bunch of QSAs trained and ready, let’s say around 3 to start off with. Each QSA will need to go for a training costing around RM12 – 13K, so let’s say you have 3 (which is very few), you are setting aside around MYR 50K for that. On top of that, there are obligations such as Insurance Coverage that is specified in the QSA Qualifications Requirement document. So it depends on which insurance you are taking, but it could be in the region of around MYR6K or above premium (spitballing). There is a requalification each year as well.

QSAs then can make their own calculations on how fast/long they need to recover their cost, but let’s say they set aside 200K just to get things set up with 3 or 4 QSAs, then they need to recover that cost. A man day of a QSA/Consultant may range from quite widely in this region but let’s say you decide to price it at “meagre” MYR2K, depending on how senior you have, so overall, you would need to have almost around 1.5 months of engagement of their QSAs just to recover the cost of setting up shop. That’s why its not unreasonable to see higher rates, because of the cost it takes.

You have salaries to consider as well. You also have to consider if something happens to one of your clients, where you happily audited them remotely and believed everything they said, and found out that they have done jack-shoot in their actual environment and you have to handle the fallout of liabilities.

Some procurement compares QSA engagements to firewall engineers. No knock on other technical engineers, but the cost of getting a Checkpoint firewall engineer and the cost to maintain one QSA is a different proposition. I am not saying one is better than another technically (I’ve seen a lot of firewall engineers who could put any auditor into their place, due to their extremely proficient technical skills), I am stating the underlying cost behind the position, which is why PCI-DSS is priced at a rate that’s comparable to say, CMMI, as opposed to say, the ISO9001.

On top of just auditing cost, QSAs take into account the actual support they are giving year on year. Some of them unburden this cost to partners and consultants who have been trained (such as PKF – and there are also other matters such as independence of audit vs implementation advisory which we will discuss later), or some of them take it upon themselves. But you must know the QSAs job is not easy. Aside from auditing and supporting, there is evidence validation and report writing. Then there is the matter of undergoing the Quality Assurance process, which brings more resources/cost to the QSA company. All this while travelling to and from audit sites, reviewing etc – the life of a QSA (ask any QSA) is itinerant and often travel heavy. Burnout may also be a concern, so if the QSAs are involved in the day to day or week to week assistance to their client’s PCI program, this isn’t sustainable.

Understanding all these underlying cost will allow the procurement or whoever is evaluating to understand how to look at projects. If a QSA is pricing extremely low, the question you will need to ask is: What’s being offered? Because all QSAs have more or less the same baseline cost and if a QSA priced themselves at RM800 per man day, and they are a small shop with less than 5 QSAs, what would then be their recovery rate? 200 man days of engagement to recover their initial cost? Most procurement wouldn’t think of things like this and they would just go to their “BAFO” Best and Final Offering – but when you break it down on what is expected, then you would understand that not all PCI offerings are the same. I could simply quote a client 3 man days of QSA work for the final audit and be done. That would be the best and final offering that would win. But what about the healthchecks, the management of the evidences and how they are submitted, the quality checking, the scope optimisation process, the controls checking etc etc?

And in line with our effort estimation, one should also split the pricing into two: Audit and Consultation vs Implementation service and products.

Because if let’s say we find your Requirement 10 is completely empty, and you are thinking to purchase a QRadar SIEM to address it, you could be looking upwards of RM60,000 just to get the product in. Couple that with training for engineers, usage, hiring etc, and you are well over the six figure stage just for Requirement 10! How about testing and application reviews? If you don’t have the personnel on this, then you have to consider setting aside another RM50K etc depending on how many applications/mobile applications/ systems you have in place. So it’s highly essential to have the QSA/consultant assist you in scope reduction. Most may not view it that way, so it’s essential to find an auditor who is experienced and who looks after your interest.

Finally, understand that cost of audit/consulting would be different depending on how you go through PCI-DSS. Level 1 certification requires the effort of validating evidences, doing gap assessments and auditing and writing the RoC. Level 2 SAQ with QSA signoff is slightly easier, as there is no RoC to write while the last option of self signed SAQ without QSA is obviously a lot less costly as you are basically doing a self-signoff. Those are just broad guidelines and not how QSAs may price it, because as I say, due to variables.

You could opt to use the rule of 1/3 when it comes to estimating these costs, although your mileage may vary. For instance, if the QSA throws a RM100K audit fees (comparing it to CMMI fees) for a Level 1 Certification, then a RM60-65K (2/3 of the Level 1) for a SAQ Signoff could be reasonable; and furthermore if you just need them in for consultancy for the non QSA signoff SAQ, it could be 30K (1/3 of the level 1) or so. But note, the SAQ self signoff can be carried out entirely on your own, so the cost could be close to zero as well.

I know its a tough one to place this as pricing varies so often. We aren’t selling a product with specific hardware/software. We are selling a service that will take you through 6 months of work to cover scoping exercise, project meetings, changes, consultancy and advisory, pre-audits and post audits checks, evidence and artefacts sample validations, audit, report writing, training and all the variables in between.

Let us know if you need us to look at your PCI today, drop us a note at pcidss@pkfmalaysia.com and we will attend to you immediately!

PCI-DSS: The AoC Problem

pci-compliance
pci-compliance

Recently we were reminded once again why we constantly state that PCI-DSS must chuck away the Certification of Compliance for good. Not only it’s an unacceptable documentation to the PCI Council, but it presents a lot of problems for auditors and assessors, as well as organisations seeking PCI-DSS compliance evidence from their service providers.

Let’s go back to how PCI-DSS flows in the first place.

PCI-DSS applies to all organisations that store, process and transmit credit/debit card under the umbrella of Visa, Mastercard, Amex, JCB and Discover/Diner.

Requirement 12.8 further extends the need to manage service providers where card data is being shared, and where “they could impact the security of the customer’s cardholder data environment”. That word is key because many service providers we have spoken to retorts they are out of scope of PCI-DSS of their clients because:

a) They only provide infrastructure and has no access to card data

b) They only store physical copies of forms that are sealed in boxes and they don’t access it

c) They only provide hosting

d) They only provide customer service support

e) They only provide toilet cleaning services

Of the 5 most popular services above, only the last one, we can probably surmise, does not require PCI-DSS. The rest – not to say they are 100% applicable – would require at the very least a bit of scoping to determine if they are applicable or not for PCI. Such is the problem here.

Having established that even, say a cloud service provider that only provides IaaS, requires PCI-DSS, what is then the next problem?

We call it the problem of the AoC. Or rather, the lack-of-AoC. Or more accurately, the-refusal-of-service-providers-to-provide-AoC-since-they-already-have-the-Certificate-of-Compliance problem. Its a very long problem name, so we will just call it the Problem of the AoC.

The AoC is the Attestation of Compliance, which is basically a shortened version of the Report on compliance (ROC) or the Self Assessment Questionnaire (SAQ). So in ALL PCI-DSS Compliance, whether assessed by 3rd party or self assessed, there is an AoC. 100%.

This AoC will describe in summary what are the processes in scope of PCI-DSS AND services that are NOT in scope of PCI-DSS. This is absolute key. In Part 2 of the SAQ, it states the type of service and the name of Service included in the PCI-DSS compliance (below):

Right after that, we need to ensure there may be services being offered that for some reason is NOT assessed for PCI. An example here could be a company offering BPO services, but at the same time offering a payment gateway service. They could be PCI compliant for payment gateway but not compliant for their BPO – even though both would deal with credit cards. So we need due care in determining whether the service we are procuring from them is indeed, PCI Compliant.

This is very important. And the fact that most “Certificate of Compliance” actually does not state the scope of services under PCI-DSS, presents a problem for assessors.

We once had a very animated discussion with a large service provider providing a customer support application to our client that collected credit card information. The service provider insisted they are PCI-DSS compliant and they showed their ‘Certificate of Compliance’. The said their AoC is private and confidential and all of their customers have accepted their Certificate as proof of their compliance, which meant, we are obligated to accept it as well (according to their very animated representatives).

Now, we all know the Certificate of Compliance is as valuable as toilet paper (actually, maybe less, since toilet paper can sometimes be VERY valuable during the pandemic and panic buys) – so we insisted on them showing us their AoC. For the simple reason:

They offered the on-prem application to our client, i.e installed onsite to our client’s environment. Our client says since this application is ‘PCI-DSS’ compliant, we should not need to assess their application under Requirement 6 of PCI-DSS. Hmm.

This doesn’t sound right. The vendor kept insisting that PCI-DSS only requires them to show their Certificate, and that the information in their AoC are private and confidential and we have no right to request from them.

PCI-DSS is applicable to an environment, process and location. You can see these ALL clearly in the AoC. Not in the nonsensical and utterly useless Certificate of Compliance. Why we didn’t believe this was that, because the application was installed in our client’s environment, there shouldn’t be an instance where this application is “PCI-DSS” compliant. At most, they could claim an application to be PA-DSS compliant (or the new SSF compliant) – but that is also impossible as their application wasn’t a payment application related to settlement or authorisation – so it’s not eligible for PA-DSS! So how can this be ‘PCI-DSS Compliant’?

We were at an impasse. Because they refused to give their AoC, we refused to accept their Certificate of Compliance. They lodged a complaint, we stood firm. We were not going to pass our customer on the basis of some hocus-pocus documentation which was clearly NOT acceptable to the PCI council!

Finally, they relented, and gave us a redacted, valid AoC and telling us how wrong we were in insisting on this and we did not know what we were doing. But all we needed to see was the page above – where the scope of compliance was summarised. And in it, stated “XXXX Customer Service Cloud Solution”.

Cloud solution.

We asked the customer, did they subscribe to the cloud solution?

No, they didn’t. It was an on-prem. Installed, lock stock and barrel application into the VM managed by our client. In an environment and location secured by our client.

Wait, said the vendor. The on-prem solution is the same as the cloud solution backend they were using and have been assessed for PCI. So what was our problem? The only difference was that their ‘cloud solution’ was now installed on customer side, so this should still be acceptable.

So, well, that isn’t a cloud solution then, is it? I mean, if you have a secured safe and you put it into your high-security house, would that also mean you can put the same safe in the middle of Timbuktu somewhere and still have the same level of security? (No offense to Timbuktu, we are just using that as a reference…we should stop using it actually but oh well.) Wouldn’t the cloud solution also be assessed for its environment, processes and policies? Would this be the same on the customer end?

The point here, is that based on the AoC, we can clearly say that the PCI compliance isn’t applicable to the on-prem solution. So we still have to assess the application as it is, under Requirement 6, under the client’s PCI program.

This isn’t any ‘victory’ or whatever we can claim, but it is so extremely frustrating to waste so much time on matters that would not be any issue at all, if the problem of the AoC is resolved. Just HAVE THE AoC TO ATTEST PCI-DSS! And stop this Certificate baloney! Because of this, we end up behind schedule and we have to chase up again and again.

So, read the AoC thoroughly before you decide on a vendor/service provider – because the certificate they provide to you could very well be invalid to the services they are actually offering you. Insist on the AoC.

Drop us a note at pcidss@pkfmalaysia.com to know more about your compliance. We will respond to you immediately!

ASV Scans /= PCI Compliance

There is an old story about a chicken and eagle. I hear this story being told by life coaches or motivational trainers trying to get through to our thick, jaded, technical skull that there is something more to life than coding and technology.

The abbreviated version is this: A farmer was walking and finds an eagle’s egg fallen out of the nest. He picks it up, brings it back to his farm, and puts it into the chicken coop. Soon, it hatches, and joins the other chickens in the farm and learns how to be a chicken, even though its an eagle. So this is where some of the version diverges.

a) The chicken and the eagle starts talking one day and the eagle notices another eagle flying high in the sky and he goes, “Dang, I wish I could be an eagle,” and his chicken-pal looks at him scornfully and says, “You are a chicken. How can you be like the king of all birds, soaring through the sky?” So the eagle keeps thinking he is a chicken and the next day he gets roasted for dinner. And the farmer finds his meat a bit tough and doesn’t taste like chicken at all. The moral here is: Don’t let your limitations inhibit you or you will end up a cooked and eaten. This is probably the original version before the other two came along below:

b) The farmer is visited by a naturalist who observes this ‘chicken’ and immediately knows he is an eagle. So he takes this chicken up to a high cliff, and throws him over, shouting: “Spread your wings and fly! Soar like the eagle you are meant to be!” And the eagle soars through the clouds and sky and become the king of all birds. The moral of the story: All of us are eagles, even if you think you are a chicken. All you need is a life coach or a motivational trainer to throw you off the ledge and you will soar. This is the preferred version for life coaches and motivational speakers. For obvious reason.

c) Same as story b) above, but instead of soaring, the naturalist throws the ‘chicken’ off the ledge, and it falls 100 feet and splatters its brains all over the bottom of the ledge and dies since it doesn’t know how to fly. And gets cooked and roasted for dinner. The moral of the story (and this is by far, our more preferred, realistic and risk-averse version): Don’t do something you may be destined for but not ready for. Or you will end up smashed, cooked and eaten.

All three versions have this theme in common: The eagle isn’t a chicken and the chicken isn’t an eagle. The chicken may have commonalities of an eagle, like wings and a beak, but just because it has those doesn’t make it an eagle.


Yes, I am aware that the anecdote above isn’t a very good illustration of the point I am trying to make, but I couldn’t think of a better one. And in a roundabout way, what I want to illustrate here is that ASV scans do not make you PCI Compliant.

We get this a lot.

A company would come and say they are PCI-compliant. Or we have a client who outsources certain portion of their operations to another company and that company comes back and shows us their ASV compliant scan and says this is all they need to show us. We (The auditors/consultants) are compelled to accept this because the ASV scans demonstrate their PCI Compliance, they say.

Let’s make a point here: ASV questions and subquestions in the SAQ D covers around 14 queries. Out of around 600. That means ASV covers 2.33% of PCI-DSS. There is a massive load of other controls and items covering PCI-DSS Other than those precious ASV quarterly scans. What about your patching? Hardening? Firewall security? HR policies? Logging and monitoring? Logical access? MFA? Hardening of systems? Anti-virus and host firewalls? What about service provider management? What about vendor default passwords? What about storage, encryption, key management? Software development? Application and penetration testing? Internal vulnerability scans? Training?

You can see how impossible it is to accept just the ASV report as an evidence of PCI compliance, much like how we cannot accept the chicken as an eagle, but yet, we are constantly berated upon that we don’t know what we are doing and that their Banks have accepted their ASV scans as a sign of PCI compliance, so we should to. But we can’t. We can’t accept 2.33% as a 100% of something. It’s simply mathematically not possible.

So there you go – banks. Why do banks perpetuate this myth that PCI compliance = ASV scans? Why? It’s 2.33% of PCI-DSS! You can’t accept something as an eagle just because it has wings and a beak! There’s really no argument about it.

Here is what 2.3% feels like:

a) The number of Jazz music of all US Music sales in 2013

b) Increase in slot machine spending in New Zealand in 2018 Q1

c) Auto parts industry against the US GDP in 2013

d) Android 6.0 Marshmallow installation for all Android devices in July 2016

e) Thats lesser than the % of freshwater we have on this planet (2.5% of water on the planet is freshwater)

I am sure there’s a lot of 2.33% out there on this planet, but the point we are making is this: It’s not compliance. It’s a small but important part of compliance but it’s not compliance. So no matter what your banks tell you, we can never accept the ASV scan as a sign of PCI compliance. It can be accepted as one of the evidences of PCI compliance amongst many, but not as an evidence of complete compliance.

Now, stop calling a chicken an eagle. Let us know about your questions for PCI or any compliance at pcidss@pkfmalaysia.com.

The Art of Compensating Controls

In our many advisories over the years with companies going through PCI, some of the challenges we face include this little thing called compensating controls.

It’s a PCI term in many sense. Same as ‘segmentation penetration testing’. It’s when you can’t address the actual control in PCI-DSS for a reason and you need to put other controls to address the ‘spirit’ of the control. The spirit means: why did PCI-DSS put that control in, in the first place?

Immediately, this becomes an outlet of some of the greatest creativity ever existed in our technology field. If everyone involved can channel such creativity of controls into developing innovative tech, we would be far ahead achieving the technology vision 2020 that our country is lagging behind in. As they say: Necessity becomes the mother of invention. So everyone starts inventing controls.

Unfortunately such invention of controls in thin air will likely face a bounced rejection from the QSA which would further cause stress due to the impending deadline and the admission that the compliance will be delayed. So it’s in everyone’s interest that compensating controls are done correctly from the beginning.

Now this article’s purpose is not to go through the whole list of what compensating controls are. There are already thousands of articles that do that. Suffice to say, a compensating control is when you cannot meet the PCI requirements and you still want to be compliant.

So to make it simple:

a. Write which control you can’t address. It may be logging and monitoring, complex password etc.

b. Why can’t you do it? Some good reasons are that the legacy system that runs on the factory store churning out a thousand printed statements a minute, that cannot be patched due to patches no longer being produced. A bad reason is, Bob is new to the company and has no clue what does patching means.

c. Risk Analysis. This isn’t something natural many companies do for IT, but it has to be done. If the system cannot be patched what are the risks? Infection of malware? Internal exploit? Availability problem? Loss of power?

d. Document the control. This has to be done. You can’t just go and say, “OK, QSA, trust us, it’s in.” It needs to be detailed procedures on how the organisation will carry out these compensating controls.

e. Ensure it’s implemented and validate it with the QSA. In fact, we would suggest to bring in the QSA early in the process. Since they are the ones validating your controls, it makes sense to onboard them with the fact that you are doing compensating controls. What you may find acceptable to your risk may not be acceptable to the QSA. It’s not a matter of, “Hey, let me bear the risk this year!”. It’s a matter of “If this thing goes south, who else is going to be affected?” – QSA, banks, companies – because credit card information isn’t just the domain of the company handling it – it has upstream and downstream repercussions – from the payment brands, banks, acquirers TPA, service providers to the customers.

To be honest, compensating is a major pain in the butt. There is no way to describe it better. It’s actually worse that the actual controls. Plus its not a given each year – QSA may decide due to next year’s evolving risks your controls are no longer acceptable!

An example here: say you can’t patch your pre-historic system for a good reason. The vendor has since announced they no longer support that system and a new release is imminent in a year’s time and the notice is for all customers to bear down and wait for the release. At this moment it’s completely out of the customer’s hands.

The compensating controls could be

a) Having a documented notice from the vendor that security patching cannot be done

b) Hosting the system in an isolated VLAN that does not have any other CDE/non-cde systems

c) MFA needs for ALL access, not just administrative

d) Firewall rules must be specific to port/source/destination

e) Copy/paste, USB etc are disallowed in said system, and any attempts to do that is logged through DLP.

f) Antimalware must be installed and logs monitored specifically

g) Logging and monitoring needs to be reviewed daily specifically for this system and a report daily separately for incidents to this system

Taking a look at the above examples, these are controls that are considered above and beyond what is necessary for PCI requirements. In short, its a lot harder or more expensive to get compensating controls done than for the actual controls, no matter what you may think.

We once had a conversation with a company who were thinking of switching to us from previous consultants. When asked, we realised that many of their systems were not PCI compliant and they had put in compensating controls. Their compensating controls were: “Mitigation plan is in place to replace these systems in a year’s time.”

That’s not a compensating control. That’s something you plan to do in 365 days time. In the meantime, what are you proposing to lower the risk? That’s your compensating controls.

Don’t use the compensating controls as a get out of jail free card. Any consultant/QSA worth their salt would know how difficult it is to get these controls done and more importantly passed for PCI-DSS. In other words, instead of looking at it as a convenient shortcut or workaround, it should be viewed as the last resort.

Drop us a note at pcidss@pkfmalaysia.com for any queries you may have on PCI-DSS and we will respond to that immediately!

PCI-DSS For Software Developers

Of late we have been receiving numerous calls from software developers requesting us how on earth do they become PCI-DSS certified.

It’s never easy to explain over the phone, especially with misconceptions that PCI-DSS is a license, or a software, or a solution, or some sort of exam or some other thing. And also, how do we go about explaining to them that technically they don’t (or can’t) be PCI certified as a software vendor, but they can opt for PA-DSS or the new Secure Software Standard from PCI.

So the first thing to ask is (assuming this application/solution is handling credit card information):

a) Are you developing software only and selling that software to your customers?

b) Are you developing a solution where you are hosting and managing and allowing clients?

If it’s a), applicability of PCI-DSS is simply on your customer that is buying your software, not on you as a company. After all, you generally don’t handle credit card – your customer does. However, your software is likely in scope for their PCI-DSS assessment, so there could be an instance where you need to participate in your client’s assessment or to develop your software in a manner where it would be “PCI Compliant”. Developing a PCI compliant software doesn’t make it certified, but it does assist in helping your clients getting certified. An example would be to develop your solution with logging capability and able to log to a central location. Another example is your solution being able to integrate with AD, or to have PCI compliant password policies (session timeouts, password expiry etc). Other examples are to ensure there is Role Based Authentication and Authorisation. Or ensuring encryption is properly done for data at rest and in transit. By doing these doesn’t make it immediately PCI certifiable – but it does provide your client with less headache.

If it’s b), then yes, you are not considered just a software developer but a service provider. You are providing SAAS, so generally that makes you responsible for the day to day security of card data in behalf of your client. In that case, PCI-DSS is able to be applied to you on your solution and your process.

As with PA-DSS, the new Secure Software Program applies to the following software:

Software products involved in or directly supporting or facilitating payment transactions that store, process, or transmit clear-text account data.

Software products developed by the vendor that are commercially available for sale to multiple organizations.

So all the CRM systems, call systems, in house systems, customised systems are all not eligible for PA-DSS or the new program. This is typically in line with what has always been, anyway.

So that leaves us back to square one. What happens if you are not eligible for PA-DSS or Secure Software program and you are just a software developer and NOT a service provider, but your client is insisting on you being PCI-DSS certified?

Well, hopefully you can explain to them or point them out to this article. Another option you can have is to say you have developed your software that is compliant to PCI requirements. The following list shows what it should take to address PCI compliance (not comprehensive):

1.      Requirement 2 – Ensure no clear text for administrative access

2.      Requirement 3 – Application is transmitting /store and strong encryption needed

3.      Requirement 4 – Application must encrypt when transmitting over public network

4.      Requirement 6 – Software development process – secure code review, remove test data before rolling to production,  ensure application is patched, prompt when bugs are discovered.

5.      Requirement 8 – ensure the application can support PCI DSS password requirements, password is encrypted at rest and transmission

6.      Requirement 10 – the application is capable of sending logs to the SIEM, Application penetration testing is conducted and documented what methodology of testing is used.

Requirements affecting Software: Sample Evidences
For all system components in scope (servers, network devices, applications, databases, etc.) and POS devices, provide evidence of strong cryptography being implemented (ssh, TLS 1.2 or later, RDP over TLS etc.)
Provide the following for all filesystems, databases and any backup media
– Details on method (encryption, hashing, truncation, tokenization) being used to protect covered information in storage
– Evidence (screenshots or settings) showing  covered information is protected
Provide evidence of encryption being used for transmission of in-scope data over any open or public communication channel (i.e. Internet, Wireless network, GSM, GPRS, VSAT technology etc.). Encryption must confirm to strong industry standards.
For the selected sample, provide evidence of,
– Current patch levels
– Patches being deployed in a timely manner
Provide secure software development process document in accordance with industry best practices
Provide a recent secure code review report for an application that stores, processes or transmits covered information.
Provide a document that outlines
– the process for generating test data to be used in lower (test/development) environments.
– the process for removing test data and test accounts prior to moving the system to higher (production) environment.
Provide 4 sample change request (2 for software modification and 2 for security patch implementation) from the last 6 months.
Provide the following from a secure code training perspective
– Material used for training
– Attendee list showing that all developers are covered
Provide evidence of logical access account and password features to include,
– Account lockout policy
– Account lockout duration
– Session timeout policy
– Password length
– Password complexity
– Password history
– Password expiry
Provide evidence that passwords (for platform and/or consumer applications) are encrypted during transmission and storage.
Provide the audit log policy settings.
Provide actual event logs for each of the platforms identified in the sample.
Provide a documented methodology being used for penetration testing.
Provide internal penetration test report.

You would get stuck if your clients want to see the PCI-DSS certification, which obviously you won’t have. In this case, the only way forward is to talk to them saying it’s not possible for you to be PCI certified in that sense. If you want, you could actually engage a third party auditor or even a QSA to assess the application based on PCI requirements. You won’t get a certificate for PCI, but at least you have a third party attestation or report, which hopefully should be enough.

Another option is to just get a hold of us at pcidss@pkfmalaysia.com and we can maybe provide a bit more persuasion to your client in accepting your application for PCI-DSS!

« Older posts

© 2021 PKF AvantEdge

Up ↑