Month: June 2020

The Trouble with UASP

A break from our compliance articles, here is a simple hack for a problem plaguing us for some time. Our backup program is fairly comprehensive…we use a lot of different backup options. We are of the philosophy that you can never back up enough. Never. And anyway, PKF Malaysia is pretty big. We have offices in KL, Penang, Ipoh, KK, Sandakan, KB, Cambodia under us. That’s a lot of data. One of the backup options we use is automated to large external USB drives for archival.

While not the primary means of backup, it’s still pretty frustrating when we faced a strange issue with two of our external drives acting up all of a sudden. We don’t know why. They were working well enough, but suddenly, just stopped functioning well. Like a teenage kid. What happened was, we found that backups would regularly hang to the external drives (we have 2 of the same brand). At first, we thought it was just a connection issue (USB failing etc) and we took them out and tried it on various Windows servers (not *nix as we didn’t want to mess around with those, as they were critical). The idea anyway was to have these function on Windows only. Same issue was observed on all Windows servers and even on workstations and laptops.

The issue was simply excruciatingly slow transfer speeds and a graph looking similar to this:

Now that doesn’t look like a healthy drive.

What is happening here was that it would start whirring up once we tried to transfer files and the active time of the disk would be 1%. In a second, it would hit 50% and then within 2-3 seconds hit 100%. At that moment, the transfer speed had probably crawled up to around 15-20 MB/s and it would drop again to zero as the disk starts to recover. And it would happen again and again. This made data transfers impossible, especially big backups we did.

Troubleshooting it, after we tried updating firmware to no success:

a) Switched cables for the drives: Same issue

b) Switched servers / workstations : Same issue. We note we didn’t try it on *nix because those were critical to us but as an afterthought, it was probably something we could have done to isolate if the problem was the drive or the OS.

c) Switched other external drives: Works fine. So we kept one of these older drives as a control group so we know what is working

d) Switched USB3.0 to USB2.0: This is where we began to see something. The USB2.0 switch made the drives work again. However, transferring at USB2.0 speeds wasn’t why we purchased these drives anyway, but again, this is a control group, which is very important in troubleshooting as it provides a horizon reference and pinpoint to us where the issue is.

We ran all the disk checks on it and it turns out great. Its a healthy drive. So what is the issue?

We opened a support ticket to the vendor of this drive and surprisingly got a response within 24 hours asking us the issue asking us for the normal things like serial number, OS, error screens , disk management readings etc. So we gave and explained everything and then followed up with:

We have already run chkdsk, scannow, defrag etc and everything seems fine. Crystaldisk also gave us normal readings (good) so we don’t think there is anything wrong with the actual drive itself. We suspect it’s the UASP controller – as we have an older drive running USB (Serial ATA) which was supposed to be replaced by your disk – and it runs fine with fast transfer speed. We suspect maybe there is to do with the UASP connection. Also we have no issues with the active time when running on the slower 2.0 USB. Is there a way to throttle the speed?

We did suspect it was the UASP (USB Attached SCSI Protocol) that this drive was using. Our older drives were using traditional BOT (Bulk Only Transport) and the USB3.0 was working fine. Apparently UASP was developed to take advantage of the speed increases of USB3.0. I am not a storage guy, but I would think UASP is able to handle transfers in parallel while BOT handles in sequential. I would think UASP is like my wife in conversation, taking care of the kids, cooking, looking at the news, answering an email to her colleague, sending a whatsapp text to her mum and solving world hunger. All at once. While BOT is me, watching TV, unable to do anything else until the football game is over. That’s about right. So it’s supposed to be a lot faster.

How UASP works though is it requires both the OS and the drive to support it. The USB controller supporting this in Windows is the uaspstor.sys. You can check this when you look at the advanced properties in device manager and clicking on the connected drive or through disk management screen and view the detailed properties. Interestingly, our older drives loaded usbstor.sys which is the traditional BOT.

UASP is backward compatible to USB2.0, so we don’t really know why USB2.0 worked while USB3.0 didn’t. The symptoms were curiously the same. Even at USB2.0, the active time would ramp up, but we think, because USB2.0 didn’t have enough pipe to transfer, the transfer rates were around 30 MB/s and the active time of the drive peaked around 95%. So because it never hit the 100% threshold for the drives to dial down, we don’t see the spike up and down like we see in USB3.0. However, active time of 90+% still isn’t that healthy, from a storage non-expert perspective.

The frustrating thing was, the support came back with

Thank you very much for the feedback. Regarding to the HDD transferring issue, we have to let you know that the performance of USB 3.0 will be worse when there is a large amount of data and fragmented transmission. The main reason is the situation caused by the transmission technology not our drive. For our consumer product, if the testing result shown normal by crystaldiskinfo, we would judge that there is no functional issue. Furthermore, we also need to inform you that there is no UASP function design for our consumer product. If there are any further question, please feel free to contact us.

One of the key things I always tell my team is that tech support, as the first line of defence to your company MUST always know how to handle a support request. The above is an example how NOT to be a tech support.

Firstly, deflecting the issue from your product. Yes, it may be so that your product is not the issue. But when a customer comes to you asking for help, the last thing they want to hear is, “Not my problem, fix it yourself.” That’s predominantly how I see tech support, having worked there for many years ourselves. We have a secret script where we need to segue the complaint to where we are no longer accountable. For instance – did you patch to latest level? Did you change something to break the warranty? Did you do something we told you not to do in one of the lines amongst the trillion lines in our user license agreement? HA!

So no, don’t blame the transmission technology. Deflecting the issue, and saying the product is blameless is what we in tech support call the “I’ll-do-you-a-favor” manoeuvre. Because here, they establish that since they are not obligated to assist anymore, any further discussion on this topic is a ‘favor’ they are doing for you and they can literally exit at any point of time. It makes tech support look good when the issue is resolved and if the going gets too tough, it’s not too hard to say goodbye.

Secondly, don’t think all your clients are idiots. With the advent of the internet, the effectiveness of bullshitting has decreased dramatically from the times of charlatans and hustlers peddling urine as a form of teeth whitening product. They really did. Look it up. Maybe, a full drive would have some small impact to the performance. But a quick look at the graph shows a drive that is absolutely useless, not due to a minuscule performance issue but to an obvious bigger problem. I mean how is it that we can make a logic that once it reaches a certain percentage of drive storage it is rendered useless?

Lastly, know your product. Saying there is no UASP function is like us telling our clients PCI-DSS isn’t about credit cards but about, um, the mating rituals of tapirs. The tech support unfortunately did not bother to get facts correct, and the whole response came across as condescending, defensive and uninformed.

So now, we responded back:

I am not sure if this is correct, as we have another brand external drive working perfectly fine with USB3.0 transmission rates, whether its running a file or transferring a file to and from the external drive. Your drive performance is problematic when a file was run directly from the drive, and also transmission to copy file TO the drive. As we say, the disk itself seems ok but regardless, the disk is not usable when connecting to our USB 3.0 port, which most of our systems have, that means the your external drive can only work ok for USB 2.0. We suggest you to focus the troubleshooting on the UASP controller.

Further on, after a few back and forth where they told us they will recheck we responded

Additional observation: Why we don't think its a transmission problem, aside from the fact other drives have no issues, is that when we run a short orientation video file from your drive, your drive active time ramps up to 100% quickly - it goes from 1% - 50% - 100%, then the light stops blinking, and it drops back to 1% again, and it ramps up again.  This happens over and over. We switched to other laptops and observed the same issue. On desktops as well, different Windows systems.  What we don't want to do is to reformat the whole thing and observe, because, really, the whole reason for this drive is for us to store large files in it as a backup, and not have a backup of backup. We have also switched settings to enable caching (and also to disable it) - same results. The drives are in NTFS and the USB drivers have been updated accordingly. We have check the disk, ran crystaldisk, WMIC, defrag (not really needed as these are fairly new), but all with same results.  We dont find any similar issues online, of consistent active time spikes like we have shown you, so hopefully support can assist us as well.  

After that, they still came back saying they needed more time with their engineers and kept asking us whether other activities were going on with the server and observing the disk was almost full. We did a full 6 page report for them, comparing crystaldiskinfo results of all our other drives (WD, Seagate) and point out specifically their disks were the ones having the spike issues and requested them again to check the controllers.

After days of delay, stating their engineers were looking into it, and our backups were stalled they came back with:

Regarding to the HDD speed performance, we kindly inform you that the speed (read/write) of products will be limited by different testing devices, software, components and testing platforms. The speed (read/write) of products is only for reference. From the print screen that you provide,  we have to let you know that the write speed performance is slow because there are data stored in this drive. Kindly to be noted that the speed may vary when transferring huge data as storage drive or processing heavy working load as storage drive. Besides, please refer to the photo that we circled in red, both different drive have different data percentage.  For our drive, the capacity is near full, then it is normal to see the write speed performance slower than other drive.

This response was baffling . It wasn’t just slow. It was unusable because there is data stored in this drive? Normal to see write speed slower?

After almost a week and half talking to this tech support, they surmise (with their engineers) that their drives cannot perform because there is data stored in it. It makes one wonder then why are disk drives created if not to store data.

Our final response was:

We respectfully disagree with you. Your drive is unusable with those crystaldisk numbers and I am sure everyone will agree to that. You are stating your drive is useless once it starts storing data, which is strange since your product is created to store data. Whether the drive is half full or completely full is not the point, we have run other drives which are 95% full and which are almost 100% full with no issues. Its your drive active time spiking up to 100% for unknown reasons, and we have not just one but two of your drives doing this. We have insisted you to look at the controller but it seems you have not been able to troubleshoot that.  I believe you have gone the limit in your technical ability and you are simply unable to give anymore meaningful and useful support, and I don't think there's anything else you can do at that will be of use for us .We will have to mark it out as a product that we cannot purchase and revert back to other drives for future hard drive purchase and take note of your defective product to our partners. 

And that was the end. Their tech support simply refused to assist and kept blaming a non-existent event (data are stored in the disk), which had absolutely zero logical sense. It was a BIZARRE tech conclusion that they came to and an absolute lesson of what not to do for tech support.

That being said, we temporary resolved the issue with a workaround by disabling one of our servers using UASP and force it to use BOT. This hack was taken from this link, so we don’t get the credit for this workaround.

Basically you go to C:\Windows\System32\drivers and just rename uaspstor.sys to uaspstor.sys.bk or whatever to back it up. Then copy usbstor.sys to uaspstor.sys.

Depending on your system, you might have to do this in safe mode. We managed to do it without. Reboot and plugged in the troublesome drive and now it works. Some other forums says to go to the registry and basically redirect the UASPStor Imagepath to usbstor.sys instead of uaspstor.sys. However, this is problematic as when you try to plugin a traditional external drive using BOT, it doesn’t get recognised, because we think that the usbstor.sys is locked for usage somehow. So having a usbstor.sys copied to uaspstor.sys seems to trick Windows into using the BOT drivers instead while thinking it’s using this troublesome UASP driver.

Now obviously this isn’t a solution, but it’s a workaround. For us, we just plug these drives into one of the older servers and used it as a temporary backup server until we figure out this thing in the long run.

But yeah, the lesson was really in our interaction with tech support and hopefully we all get better because of this! For technical solutions and support, please drop us a email or the comment below and we will get to you quickly and in parallel (not sequentially)!

Is PCI-DSS the most confusing standard?

After being involved in PCI-DSS for almost a decade as well as other standards and guidelines like ISO27K, 27017, 9001, PDPA, GDPR, CMMI and a partridge in a pear tree, we can almost unanimously say: PCI-DSS is probably the most confusing standard out there. Not so much of the content itself – it’s fairly easy to understand in terms of the technical controls. The confusion begins at the start: Applicability and Scope.

Now scoping for PCI-DSS has been hammered by us in many articles over the years, so for this article, we will look at Applicability.

So what is applicability?

It simply means, who does this standard apply to? This is different from ‘scope’. A scope is basically what is being assessed? Applicability is basically: Do I need to do this thing?? For instance for simplicity:-

a) GDPR = Applies to entities processing EU personally identifiable information. Entities that may have a more global presence or require to deal with customers with a larger market distribution may end up being applicable to the GDPR.

b) PDPA = applies to entities in Malaysia processing personal information, which basically means almost everyone.

c) ISO27001 = guideline that can be used by any entity to cover their core processes. This may also be required by some governments on certain industries, e.g the government requiring CNII (Critical National Information Infrastructure), so simply, if you are CNII, then you should be doing the ISO27K.

d) CSA Star Alliance = standard for our data centers to apply, but it’s not mandatory (as far as we know).

e) TVRA = based on MAS (Monetary Authority of Singapore) requirement for financial institutions, so generally if you are regulated by them, then you need to get this done. It’s actually a subset of their Technology Risk Management Guidelines. It’s pretty much a mirror of Malaysia’s RMiT (Risk Management in Technology) subset of data center resilience section. As an aside it seems slightly comical that these two countries, tied so closely together in terms of history and economy would sit down and decide to name their federal bank’s IT standard so closely to each other. I mean, it’s like:

i) Singapore – Let’s call our technology standard Technology Risk Management!

ii) Malaysia – Hmm, we can’t sound the same otherwise we might look like we aren’t original. Let’s flip it around and call it Risk Management in Technology!

Back to the subject, most standards out there has a reasonably clear idea of who it applies to. Even Bank Negara’s e-money guidelines or their baseline IT security requirements – apply to those regulated by them. HIPAA (not in Malaysia) applies to medical and healthcare entities.

Which leaves us with PCI-DSS.

From the onset, PCI-DSS applicability is actually very clear:

PCI DSS also applies to all other entities that store, process or transmit cardholder data (CHD) and/or sensitive authentication data (SAD).

PCI-DSS Standard

So in general, whenever you are storing, processing or even transmitting any part of the card holder data (PAN) or the sensitive authentication data, e.g track data, CVV etc, then PCI applies to you.

The confusion begins when these exact terms are used by those who are NOT doing any of these 3 (Store, Transmit, Process or STP) –lets call them NON STP– but still gets pulled into scope kicking and screaming like a child on his first day of kindergarten or adults on their first day of work after a holiday in the Bahamas. Examples are data centers, hosting providers, physical security storage companies (storing secure boxes for companies) – in their business model, they don’t deal with credit cards at all. But their customers may. Or may not. They don’t know. So for instance, if an insurance company decides to store their policy files with credit card information physically into a box and ship it to the physical storage company, how does the storage company gets yanked into ‘applicability’ of PCI?

The problem of section 12.8.2:

12.8.2 Maintain a written agreement that includes an acknowledgement that the service providers are responsible for the security of cardholder data the service providers possess or otherwise store, process or transmit on behalf of the customer, or to the extent that they could impact the security of the customer’s cardholder data environment

pci dss standard

The last part is where QSAs hook on – ‘impact the security of the customer’s CDE’. Now, just to be clear, 12.8.2 by itself has no indication that PCI is a requirement for these “NON STP” providers. It comes later in 12.8.4 and 12.8.5 where it states

12.8.4 Maintain a program to monitor service providers’ PCI DSS compliance status at least annually.

PCI dss standard

Argument on whether this relates to PCI-DSS compliance as a program or just service providers adhering to the PCI-DSS controls internally is an argument beyond time and space itself and requires a thesis to be written on it. Hence for now, simplicity wise, going by the standards and how many QSAs interpret it, multi factor authenticating providers gets pulled in. Hosting and cloud providers get pulled in. Storage vendors get pulled in. Cloud HSM and security providers gets pulled in. Fraud management gets pulled in. The whole thing about who could impact the security of customer’s environment gives QSAs a field day in including everyone in the party.

So applicability isn’t so straightforward after all. After determining anyone that stores, transmit and process credit/debit card with the PCI council members badges — now we have anyone that influences the security of the first group’s card data environment. This basically pulls almost everyone into applicability.

It doesn’t end there, however.

Because of the way PCI is structured, the PCI council actually washes their hands to determine who should be PCI compliant, and how they should be compliant. They pass that over to the individual card brands (I guess that’s themselves), who passes it to their banks connecting to their network, who in turn passes it on to their payment providers and who in turn passes either to their service providers or to their merchants. This is looked into in FAQ #1473, #1126, #1212 and a whole lot of other references. They always have this statement:

The PCI SSC recommends that entities contact their acquirer and/or the payment brands directly, as applicable, to understand their validation reporting requirements. Please contact the payment brands directly.

Everywhere to ensure everyone knows

When we were kids we used to play a party game whereby two teams have everyone sitting in two long straight lines. At the front of the line, the gamekeeper passes them a message, for instance “There is a blue wolf sitting in the Artic, looking at you with yellow, hungry eyes tonight” or something like that. Each kid will then need to whisper that message to the person behind him until it reaches the last person and that last person will have to go to the front and declare the message aloud, which invariably ends up something like “There comes wind that blew into the attic and sitting at me with fellow grey ice to the right.”  And everyone laughs.

This is how it is in PCI. The message gets passed down and somehow along the way, the message gets so jumbled that we can only shrug and go, “OK…” Some messages we have heard (from customers who claim their banks said):

a) “You need to show us their SAQ and ROC together! The AoC is not enough” – Not really. If you are doing SAQ, there’s no ROC (Report of Compliance). Likewise, if there is a ROC, it’s not SAQ. Both have AoC though.

b) “Physical storage companies that store physical card data like forms needs to do SAQ C-VT” – We’ve seen this, where storage company gave a SAQ C-VT (virtual terminals) to their banks and was accepted. No, you can’t. A physical storage company, being a service provider should look at the SAQ D and then mark of the irrelevant controls (such as firewall etc) as Not Applicable.

c) “You can do SAQ A – as a payment gateway!” – A permutation of b) – whereby a payment provider gave us an SAQ A as proof of their PCI compliance. I think they just scanned through which is the shortest SAQ A and go, OK, let’s go for the easiest. No, SAQ A isn”t applicable to service providers. SAQ D needs to be done and controls that are relevant to be identified.

d) “You can store hashes with truncated data, its more secure!” – This is more of our previous post, where a company we spoke to started arguing on the merits of implementing truncation, encryption, hashing and storing everything together. No, it doesn’t work like that. If Truncated information and simple hashing is stored together, without a random salt, it may be easier to determine the card information through common sense brute force (please don’t talk about rainbow tables).

e) “They need me to be a level 4 certified gateway provider since I do less than 6 million transaction.” – In general service provider levels are only level 1 and level 2, according to visa and mastercard and amex. Secondly, the transaction levels for level 1 Visa and Mastercard are 300,000 volume, significantly lower than 6 million (which is for merchants). Amex has a higher threshold (2.5 million) but in general, we look at Visa/Mastercard since they are the most widely distributed.

f) “They insist on seeing a certificate of compliance – other documents are not allowed” – This has become so common that it’s painful. There is no such thing as certificate of compliance. These are all conjured up in the imagination of QSAs and PCI-DSS never issues certificates. It is technically as useless as showing your birth certificate to your bank. Yet, your bank insist upon it. FAQ #1220 of PCI addresses it below. So while it’s not wrong to issue certificates, but these are not considered “official documents”:

Because certificates and other non-authorized documentation are not officially recognized, entities that receive these documents to indicate their own compliance (for example, from a QSA or ASV) or another entity’s compliance (for example, from a service provider) should request that official PCI SSC documentation be provided. Any organization issuing, providing, or using certificates as an indication of compliance must also be able to provide the official documents. 

FAQ #1220

g) “Since you only transmit and process card data and not store, no need for PCI-DSS” – We get this a lot from banks. Technically if you transmit or process card data , you should be PCI applicable. However, since banks have a big say in your compliance (for instance they may force you to be level 1 compliant even if you have zero transactions), on the flip side, if they say they don’t need it, then well, you don’t need it. You could probably argue with them and say you actually do need it from a technical point of view, but most customers just take the bank for their word and move on. The bank has made their risk assessment, and if they insist we don’t need to be PCI compliant and gives a black and white stating they don’t need – essentially they (the bank) is absorbing all the risk of non-compliance, aren’t they? Remember – PCI-DSS is generally a contractual obligation between parties. If the bank says contractually you are not required for PCI-DSS, then what’s the argument? In this case, we usually advice our clients to still undergo a self assessment to ensure they are aware of the security practices and we then get a nod of wise agreement before they shoo us out of the room, never to be heard from again. If they had a trapdoor button that drops us into the Rancor’s pit, I guess they would have used that.

h) And finally, most recently – “they say the since we only store PAN and without expiry and CVV, they said PCI-DSS isn’t applicable to us” – this is a bit mind boggling since this bank was an international bank and we think they should know better. But that doesn’t mean local banks know less, we’ll take it back. It’s just that international banks, being exposed in so many countries, would probably have the mindshare larger than local banks to know more about these things. But this one was – “You don’t store CVV and expiry date? OK – no problem, just go ahead and store PAN for all we care! Yeay!” Granted, the use of card information without information like CVV, expiry etc may not be as useful, but there are still other ways for PAN to be used – identity theft for one. Or, it can be used in combination with other information they already have. Or they just want to sell it on the dark web. PCI-DSS puts a big premium on PAN storage, so much so saying, if PAN is stored, all other information must be protected. And oh – CVV is considered Sensitive Authentication Data (SAD), and no, it cannot be stored post authorisation for whatever reason.

There are a whole lot more of strange things we have heard over the years from banks and service providers but those are the main examples. Again, I do not think it’s due to them purposely misinterpreting the standard, but like that party game, once the message gets passed down the line so many times, eventually it’s just going to end up like garbage. It’s like how I had to deal with my wife’s instructions to buy stuff from the grocery. It’s sanskrit to me…I mean how many different pasta brands are there and why must we buy such a specific one? Pasta’s pasta, no?

If you need us to help un-garble PCI-DSS for you, drop us a note at and let us get to it!

PCI-DSS and Vendors

One of the things that advisors and consultants do, as part of our journey to get our clients to comply to PCI-DSS is the inevitable (and unenviable) task of dealing with vendors. A vendor can be classified as anyone or any company that is selling a service or a product to our client, that directly or indirectly relates or affect their PCI-DSS compliance. Examples include firewall vendors, encryption technology vendors, HSM vendors, server vendors, Virtual solution vendors, SIEM vendors, SOC providers, call center solution vendors, telemarketing services, hosting providers, cloud providers and the list goes on. Having dealt with hundreds of vendors over the course of the decade we have come across all kinds: some are understanding, some are hostile, some are dismissive, some are helpful and the list goes on.

But there is always a common denominator in vendors: They all start by justifying why their product or service is:

a) Not relevant to PCI-DSS compliance (because they don’t store card data, usually)

b) Why their product is PCI acceptable (but it’s really not, or when we have questions on certain aspects of it)

It always begins with these two start points and it can then branch off into a myriad of different plots, twists, turns and endings, very much like a prolonged Korean drama.

With this in mind, we recently had an interesting call with one of such vendor, who basically runs a fairly important PCI subsystem for one of our clients. The problem was that their logs and console had two things that we sometimes find: the combination of truncated and hashed values of a credit card information, grouped together.

Now, just a very quick recap:

a) Truncated card data – This is where you see parts of the card replaced by XXXX characters (or any character) where the full card number is not STOREDNow it must be noted that TRUNCATED and MASKED are treated differently, although oftentimes confused and used interchangeably. When we say something is MASKED, it generally means the PAN (Primary account number) is stored in full but not displayed in full on the console/application etc. This applies sometimes to call centers or outsourced services where full PAN is not required for back office operations but for reconciliation or references. TRUNCATED here means even in storage, the full PAN is not present.

b) Hashed Card Data – Hashing means its a one-way transformation of card data into a hash value with no way to reverse it (Unlike encryption). If we use a SHA-256 hash algorithm on a PAN, you get a fixed result. Fraud management systems may store this hash PAN in order to identify transactions by that particular card (after hashing), and not worry about the actual card data being stored. It’s like hashing of passwords where the actual password isn’t known.

It’s to be noted, when done properly, these two instances of data may even be considered entirely out of scope of PCI-DSS. The problem here is when you have both of these stored together and correlated together, it renders the data protection weaker than just having one control available. This is probably where the concept usually gets lost on clients implementing these controls, as we have seen many times before – for example, tokenized information being stored together with truncated values.

Even PCI-DSS itself states clearly in the standard item 3.4 in the Note, that “Where hashed and truncated versions of the same PAN are present in an entity’s environment, additional controls must be in place to ensure that the hashed and truncated versions cannot be correlated to reconstruct the original PAN.”

To clarify, it doesn’t mean that it CANNOT be done, but additional controls must be in place. A further look at this is found in the Tokenization Product Security Guidelines Supplementary document:

IT 1A-3.b: Verify that the coexistence of a truncated PAN and a token does not provide a statistical advantage greater than the probably of correctly guessing the PAN based on the truncated value alone.

Further on:

…then the vendor provides documentation to validate the security strength (see Annex C – Minimum Key Sizes and Equivalent Key Strengths for Cryptographic Primitives) for each respective mechanism. The vendor should provide a truncated PAN and irreversible token sample for each.

And furthermore in Tokenization_Guidelines_Info_Supplement.pdf:

Note: If a token is generated as a result of using a hash function, then it is relatively trivial effort for a malicious individual to reconstruct original PAN data if they have access to both the truncated and hashed version of the PAN. Where hashed and truncated versions of the same PAN are present in the environment, additional controls should be in place to ensure that the hashed and truncated versions cannot be correlated to reconstruct the original PAN.

So in short, at anytime we see there are hashed values and truncated value together, we need to validated further on the controls. A good writeup is found here at another blog which summarises the issues surrounding this.

However, as our call with this particular vendor continued on, he demonstrated just how vendors should or should NOT approach PCI-DSS compliance, which sort of inspired this post:

A) DON’T place yourself as the topical expert in PCI-DSS: Don’t. Not because you are not, but because you are representing a product or a service, so you always view certain things through a lense you have been trained on. I know, because I was with vendors for many years and most of our consultants are from vendor backgrounds. He immediately started by stating, he is extremely well verse with section 3.4 of PCI-DSS (which basically talks about the 4 options of protecting card holder data stored), and that he has gone through this conversation many times with consultants. This immediately sends the QSA red flags, once the vendor starts moving away from what they know (their product) to what they may think they know but generally may not (PCI-DSS), and in general we don’t want to put the auditor on defence once vendors sound defensive. It should be collaborative. DO state clearly that we are subject matter experts in our own field and we are open to discussions.

B) DON’T recover by going ‘technical’: In his eagerness to demonstrate his opinion on PCI, he insisted that we all should know what 3.4 is about. Concerning the four controls stated in PCI-DSS (token, truncation, hashing, encryption), he claimed that their product is superior to what we are used to because his product has implemented 3 out of 4 of these controls (hashing, truncation and encryption) and he claims this makes it even more compliant to PCI-DSS. At this point, someone is going to call you out, which is what we did reluctantly as we were all staring at each other quizzically. We had to emphasize we really can’t bring this to the auditor or justify this to our client who was also on the call, as this is an absolute misinterpretation of PCI-DSS, no matter what angle you spin. PCI never told us to implement as many of these options as possible. In fact, clearly stating if more than one of these are introduced, extra care must be taken in terms of controls that these cannot be correlated back to the PAN. We told him this was a clear misinterpretation to which his response was going into a long discourse of where we consultants were always ‘harping’ on impractical suggestions of security and where we always think it’s easy to crack hashes just because we know a little bit about ‘rainbow tables’. We call this “going technical”. As Herman Melville, the dude that wrote Moby Dick puts it:

“A man of true Science uses but few hard words and those only when none others will serve his purpose; whereas the smatterer in Science… thinks that by mouthing hard words he understands hard things”. – Dude that wrote Moby Dick.

Our job is really to uncomplicate things and not to make it sound MORE complicated, because there may always be someone in the room (or video conference) who knows a little more than what they let on.

DO avoid jargonizing the entire conversation as it is very awkward for everyone, especially for those who really know the subject. DO allow input from others and see from the point of view of the standard, whether you agree or disagree or not and keep in mind the goal is common: to make our client compliant.

C) DO find a solution together. As a vendor, we must remember, the team is with the client. The consultant is (usually) with the client. So its the same team. A good consultant will always want vendors to work together. We always try to work out an understanding if vendors cannot implement certain things, then let’s see what we can work on, and we can then talk to the the QSA and reason things out. Compensating controls etc. So the solution needs to be together, and finally, after all those awkward moments of mansplaining everything to us, we just went: “OK, let’s move on, these are the limitations, let’s see where the solution is.” And after around 5 minutes or so, we had a workaround sorted out. Done. No need to fuss. So next step is to get this workaround passed by the auditor for this round and if not, then we are back again to discuss, if yes, then done, everyone is moving out to other issues. Time is of essence, and the last thing we need is each of us trying to show the size of our brains to each other.

D) Don’t namedrop and look for shorter ways to resolve issues. One of the weirdest thing that was said in the conversation after all our solution discussion was when the vendor said that he knew who the QSA was and he dropped a few names and said, just tell the QSA it’s so and so, and we’ve worked together and he will understand. Firstly, it doesn’t work like that. Namedropping doesn’t allow you to pass PCI. Secondly, no matter how long you have worked with someone, remember, another guy in the room may know that someone longer than you. We’ve been working with the QSA since the day they were not even in the country and for a decade, so we know everyone there. If namedropping was going to pass PCI, we would be passing PCI to every Tom, Dick, Harry and Sally around the world. No, it doesn’t work that way, we need to resolve the issues.

So there you have it. This may sound like a rant, but the end of the conversation was actually somewhat amicable. Firstly, I was genuinely appreciative of the time he gave us. Some vendors don’t even get to the table to talk and the fact that he did, I really think its a good step forward and made our jobs easier. Secondly, we did find the workaround together and that he was willing to even agree to a workaround, that’s a hard battle won. Countless vendors have stood their ground and stubbornly refused to budge even when PCI non-compliance was screaming at their faces. Thirdly, I think, after all the “wayang“, I believe he actually truly believed in helping our client and really thought that his product was actually compliant in all aspects. Of course, his delivery was awkward, but the intention was never to make life difficult for everyone, but to be of assistance.

At the end, the experience was a positive one, given how many discussions with vendors go south. We knew more of their solution, we worked out a solution together and more importantly, we think this will pass PCI for our client. So everyone wins. In this case, the Korean Drama ended well!

For more information on PCI-DSS, drop us a line at and we will get back to you immediately! Stay safe!

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